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al-Mart, the world’s largest corporation, has recently been 
targeted by the American and Canadian labour movements as 
organizing target number one. There are no unionized Wal-
Mart stores in the United States and only a few in Canada. The few Canadian 
shops that have been organized have not yet been able to secure a collective 
agreement. In short, as of August, 2005 Wal-Mart completely controls the 
conditions of work for all of its employees in Canada and the United States. It 
has vigorously pursued a strategy designed to keep out the union and, in those 
cases where that effort fails, to frustrate the union’s attempt to win a collective 
agreement. Because it has developed a business model that depends, to a large 
degree, on low labour costs it is a threat to the gains won historically by unions 
not only in the retail sector but across the economy. “Wal-Martization,” a concept 
that historian Nelson Lichtenstein (2005) believes may become “a template for 
21st century capitalism,” means low wages, short hours, little individual job 
security and aggressive denial of collective representation.  
In addition to labour, Wal-Mart has become the critical target of a wide 
variety of groups including environmentalists, small business, feminists and 
anti-sweatshop advocates (see e.g., Head 2004). A good deal has been written 
about all of these issues. The primary object of this article, however, is on efforts 
by Canadian Wal-Mart workers to unionize. Since the efforts in Canada and the 
US are intertwined American developments will also be briefly reviewed. 
Wal-Mart entered the retail scene in 1962 when Sam Walton opened his 
first store in Rogers, Arkansas. It quickly spread throughout the US south and 
then north and internationally. Its formula for business success has been to offer 
retail goods at prices, on average, considerably below competitors. It has been 
able to do so due to a combination of just-in-time logistics, sourcing its product 
aggressively at the lowest cost provider, operating primarily in rural areas where 
it has had less competition and by maintaining wages and benefits considerably 
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below competitors. It has achieved the latter by nurturing an aggressive anti-
union, anti-representation stance.  
In the United States, the United Food and Commercial Workers Union 
began to target Wal-Mart for organizing in the late 1990s1. In 2000 a unit of meat 
cutters was certified in Jacksonville, Texas but within a week the company 
announced that it would henceforth purchase pre-processed meat and shut 
down its meat cutting units. That action sent a message to potential union 
members that organizing would be a risky process. Since then although there 
have been several representation votes all of them have gone against the union. 
In the US, Wal-Mart has a very sophisticated unit, known as its People Division, 
whose function is to keep out the union. The company has also indicated a 
willingness to spend generously on high-priced legal talent to come up with 
strategies for frustrating union organizing attempts. It places a high priority on 
training its managers to identify unionization campaigns and counter them using 
a range of techniques that test legal boundaries. On numerous occasions, it has 
been found guilty of violating statues designed to protect worker organizing 
rights but that experience has not convinced the company to change its 
behaviour.  
Recently a majority of the workers in a small unit in Colorado signed 
union authorization cards but after Wal-Mart sent in its union-free experts to 
hammer home the company’s anti-union message to each employee one-on-one 
the vote went overwhelmingly against certification. In 2002 Wal-Mart announced 
that it was going to move into the California food retailing business. The result 
was that several California companies who had union contracts in effect with the 
UFCW demanded wage and benefit concessions. That action produced a huge 
strike/lockout that drained the union treasury (Green 2004).  
Faced with what appears to be an almost insurmountable barrier to 
organizing on a shop by shop basis, American labour has changed its tactics. 
Recently two major campaigns have been set in motion to rally a broad range of 
forces determined to compel Wal-Mart to abandon its low labour cost strategy. 
Both Wal-Mart Watch, sponsored by the Service Employees International Union 
(SEIU) and Wake Up Wal-Mart sponsored by the Union of Food and Commercial 
Workers (UFCW) are making use of tactics developed in the recent Democratic 
Party primary election and both campaigns have hired political pros to help 
organize their campaigns (Featherstone 2005). These efforts have achieved a 
good deal of public attention and have forced Wal-Mart to publicly defend its 
practices. The early 1990s campaign against Nike Corporation’s supply chain 
practices went through a similar progression before Nike began to correct the 
deficiencies highlighted by the campaigners.  
Wal-Mart entered Canada in 1994 when it purchased 122 of 144 Woolco 
stores. None of the stores that it purchased was unionized although in about half 
of those not purchased the employees had union representation. The first union 
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to take a run at Wal-Mart in Canada was the Retail, Wholesale Division of the 
United Steelworkers. 
Organizing first began in 1996 in Windsor, Ontario and in 1997 the union 
had sufficient support to file for certification by the Ontario Labour Relations 
Board (McCormick 1998). The Board held a vote that the union lost badly but, in 
the aftermath, it claimed that Wal-Mart had engaged in overt unfair labour 
practices that prevented a true test of employee preferences. The Labour Board 
agreed and, under the statute then in effect, certified the union. As it would do in 
essentially all of the cases that went in favour of the union, Wal-Mart appealed 
the decision.  It was unsuccessful but it established the pattern of using the law 
to the maximum to avoid union certification.  
In the meantime negotiations began and a tentative agreement was 
reached. That agreement was, however, rejected by the members of the 
bargaining unit. About a month later what was essentially the same agreement 
was again sent to the workers for a vote which, the union claimed, was ratified 
by the majority. A group of disgruntled employees, however, gathered testimony 
from a large number of people who asserted that they had voted to reject. These 
employees hired a lawyer and contested the contract in court and, with its 
legality in doubt, its terms never took practical effect (Douglas and Burkett 2001). 
This phenomenon of apparently independent employee groups opposed to 
unionization has repeatedly appeared in Wal-Mart stores. Although hard 
evidence is not available, union organizers claim that these efforts are 
deliberately set in motion by the company and that experts in the company’s 
employ help them to formulate strategies for thwarting unionization.  
In 1999 the USWA’s Retail Wholesale Division moved from Steel to the 
Canadian Auto Workers Union and, amidst rising legal costs with no agreement 
in sight, in 2000 CAW agreed voluntarily to give up its bargaining rights (OLRB 
2000).  
One of the results of this effort was that a very labour-unfriendly 
Conservative Ontario government was prompted to pass legislation taking away 
the power of the Labour Board to certify unions victimized by illegal activity. 
The statute came to be known as the Wal-Mart Act (Tucker 2005). In more recent 
years Wal-Mart has been aggressively campaigning to compel Canadian 
jurisdictions that still permit card-check certification to switch to a mandatory 
vote. Recent research has demonstrated that it is much more difficult for unions 
generally to become certified under mandatory vote systems than it is under card 
check (Slinn 2004).  In this quest to put in place a legal model that it has proven 
to be able to manipulate to its advantage, Wal-Mart has won the support of a 
substantial part of the business community. 
The United Food and Commercial Workers in Canada first began to 
target Wal-Mart in 2002. It did so for the same reasons as its American branch. A 
prime consideration was defense of conditions in unionized food stores that were 
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considerably better than in non-union Wal-Mart. UFCW-Canada’s first campaign 
unfolded in Quesnel, British Columbia. Wal-Mart aggressively opposed this 
effort and was, as a result, found guilty of committing unfair labour practices 
and was ordered by the Labour Board to read a summary of the decision to the 
employees and permit officials from Local 1518 to address the employees. Unlike 
the situation at Windsor, Ontario, the Board did not have the power to certify a 
union without a majority regardless of the circumstances. The BC Labour 
Relations Code had been changed in 2002 to require a vote in all certification 
cases. Board-ordered remedies for ULP’s short of certification have not proven to 
be very efficacious (McCormick 1998) and that was the case in BC. Wal-Mart’s 
public determination to avoid unionization had its intended impact and the 
union was unable to recruit a sufficient number of employees to compel a vote.  
In 2003 the UFCW was able to sign up enough workers at the Thompson, 
Manitoba Wal-Mart store to force a vote. But, faced with strong company 
opposition, the vote was lost. A year later a second vote at Thompson was also 
lost.  
In Quebec, which is generally considered to have Canada’s most labour-
friendly legal regime, the UFCW has been very active. In December of 2003 
UFCW Local 503 filed a certification application to represent workers at 
Jonquière in the Saguenay region. As in the other jurisdictions, Wal-Mart 
challenged the union’s proposed bargaining unit arguing that department 
managers had little responsibility over personnel and thus ought to be included 
in the bargaining unit. The Quebec Labour Relations Commission was 
unimpressed by that argument and ordered a vote in the unit proposed by the 
union. In April 2004 a vote was held and narrowly lost but in August of that year 
the union was certified on the basis of membership evidence.  
Shortly before negotiations were about to get underway, Wal-Mart 
announced that the store was “not meeting profit targets” and might have to 
close. After several face-to-face negotiating sessions and the appointment of a 
conciliator little progress towards an agreement had been made. On February 1, 
2005 UFCW applied to the Minister of Labour for first contract arbitration. Eight 
days later, Wal-Mart announced that it would close the store in May 2005 but 
actually shut down on April 29 one week earlier than scheduled. UFCW asked 
the Labour Board to declare Wal-Mart a runaway shop and require the company 
to reopen but, citing recent Supreme Court Decisions, it refused to do that. 
However, in September 2005, the Labour Board reversed its decision and 
found that the closing was an anti-union action that, indeed, did violate the 
labour code. The reason for the reversal is that in the initial proceeding the 
burden was on the union to prove that the company's actions were for something 
other than business reasons and it was not able, definitively, to do that. In the 
later proceeding, employees claimed that they lost their jobs because of their 
union activities. In such circumstances the burden of proof shifts to the employer 
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and Wal-Mart was unable to convince the board that anti-unionism was not 
behind the dismissal of those employees.2 
 The Jonquière development had a huge chilling effect on UFCW’s 
organizing effort. While events were unfolding in Quebec, the UFCW in Ontario 
filed an application for a vote at the once-organized store in Windsor. A few days 
later it charged the company with a litany of unfair labour practices. A vote was 
held on March 8, 2005 but in the wake of the Jonquière closing the union lost 
badly. The ULP charges are as yet unresolved. 
On April 1, 2005 UFCW lost another post-Jonquière vote, this time in 
Brossard, Quebec.  
 As these events were unfolding, in 2004 Local 1518 in British Columbia 
made an effort to organize Wal-Mart’s store in Terrace, BC. The union believed 
that it had signed up a sufficient number of the employees to compel a vote. Wal-
Mart challenged both the union’s evidence and the union’s proposed bargaining 
unit. A vote was held and the ballot box sealed. Unlike its Quebec counterpart, 
the BC Board ruled that department managers should be part of the bargaining 
unit.  That made it more difficult for the union to achieve the 45 percent of 
bargaining unit membership it needed to have the vote counted. Nevertheless, it 
believed that it had met that threshold. The Board, however, disagreed. 
Although the union appealed twice, the Board would not change its position.  
Also in 2004 the BC UFCW signed up enough workers in seven car 
services units to require a vote and the ballot box was sealed pending the 
resolution of legal issues raised by Wal-Mart. After protracted hearings the ballot 
box was opened and the votes were counted. The UFCW narrowly lost by a 32-28 
count. 
In Saskatchewan, where it is still possible for a union to be certified on the 
basis of union membership evidence, the UFCW has three certification 
applications pending. In March 2004, Local 1400 submitted an application to 
represent workers at Wal-Mart’s North Battleford store and in April, 2004 an 
application was submitted to represent workers in the Weyburn store. At North 
Battleford and Weyburn both Wal-Mart and dissenting groups of employees 
asked to appear before the Board. Determination of the applications has been 
held up because of Wal-Mart’s legal challenges to Board procedure. The union 
asked that the Board subpoena company documents including Wal-Mart’s 
infamous “Manager’s Toolbox for Remaining Non-Union.” The company 
asserted that this was an infringement of its constitutional free speech rights and 
appealed to the courts. The Saskatchewan Queen’s Bench upheld Wal-Mart’s 
challenge but the Court of Appeal overruled it and in April 2005 the Supreme 
Court refused to review that decision. Labour Board hearings on the applications 
are due to recommence in the fall of 2005.  
The third application is a bit of a long shot. One of the unionized Woolco 
stores that Wal-Mart decided not to purchase when it entered Canada was 
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located in Moose Jaw. That store closed but a few years later Wal-Mart opened a 
non-union store in the same city. UFCW is claiming that by refusing to buy a 
union store and later opening a non-union store, Wal-Mart has committed an 
unfair labour practice. UFCW is arguing that the new store should be considered 
a continuation of the old one and that UFCW bargaining rights should be 
reinstated (Cox 2004). Hearings on this case resume early in 2006. 
While Jonquière was unfolding, UFCW got some better news from other 
Quebec organizing efforts. In October 2004, the union filed an application to 
represent employees at St. Hyacinthe near Montreal and in January 2005 the unit 
was certified. Wal-Mart, in its public pronouncements, referred to the process as 
undemocratic and, following its now common pattern, appealed to the Quebec 
Superior Court, unsuccessfully, to overturn the certification. Negotiations 
continued and in May 2005 UFCW applied for conciliation. Very likely this case 
will end up at first contract arbitration. The UFCW claims that this store is 
making a lot of money so if it closes prior to a collective agreement going into 
effect, Wal-Mart’s claim that it took the action for economic reasons will have 
even less credibility than did that claim in reference to Jonquière. A Pollara poll 
taken shortly after the announcement of the shutdown at Jonquiere indicated 
that most people were not buying Wal-Mart’s claim of financial woes as its prime 
motivation for shutting down the store. Over 75% stated their belief that the 
prime motivation for the shut-down was to chill interest in unionization 
(Marotte, 2005).  
In May 2005 a separate union of tire and lube employees was certified at 
St. Hyacinthe and shortly thereafter two tire and lube express units in the 
Gatineau area were certified on the basis of cards. An application to represent all 
of the employees of one of the stores has been filed and a decision is expected 
during the fall of 2005. 
Campaigns to organize additional Wal-Mart stores continue. UFCW 
estimates that there is organizing activity underway at about 25 Wal-Mart 
locations across the country.  The UFCW is one of the more aggressive 
organizing unions in Canada. A review of the organizing efforts of 8 major 
Canadian unions between 1998-2003 found that only the Canadian Auto Workers 
and the Canadian Union of Pubic Employees filed more certification applications 
in that period  (Perlmutter 2004). During the 1990s UFCW decided to increase its 
organizing effort. It significantly expanded the number of full-time union 
organizers and also put into effect a Special Project Union Representatives 
(SPUR) program  in which it has trained some 200-300 part-time organizers. In 
part the logic behind this effort is the notion that unorganized employees are 
likely to respond favorably to organizers similar to themselves (see e.g. Yates, 
2000, 2002).  
UFCW has assigned one of its full-time organizers, Andrew Mackenzie,  
specifically to Wal-Mart. About three times a year he updates a Wal-Mart 
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pamphlet that is (ideally) distributed at all Wal-Mart stores across Canada. This 
effort commonly produces several hundred responses most of which are casual. 
When individuals willing to spend time and effort on union recruitment appear, 
an inside organizing committee is established. In order to counter expected 
employer resistance, North American unions commonly keep organizing 
campaigns secret for as long as possible. However, because of Wal-Mart’s well 
developed protocol for identifying and countering union recruitment efforts, no 
attempt is made to maintain secrecy. Union organizers believe that, in the Wal-
Mart case, they are better able to protect employees from victimization if the 
campaign is open than if it is secret. Most campaigns consist of union organizers 
visiting the homes of Wal-Mart employees to explain their rights and the 
advantages of union representation. Special Project Union Representatives are 
commonly involved in Wal-Mart organizing efforts. In one recruitment 
campaign in Quebec full-time union organizers, not only from UFCW but also 
from other Quebec unions, were involved in the effort to sign up as many people 
as possible in the shortest period.  
Martinello and Yates (2004) have found that direct contact such as home 
visits is the most effective form of organizing. They also found, however, that 
when the company uses face-to-face anti-union counter tactics, as Wal-Mart 
routinely does, the union advantage is commonly blunted. Although it is often 
found to be in violation of the law, Wal-Mart has proven willing to stretch the 
limits in order to get its “union-free” message out to its employees. As suggested 
by the contents of its “Toolbox” (which Wal-Mart claims was intended only for 
US managers), the key message is that the union can do nothing unless the 
company agrees and that the company will strongly defend its “business model.” 
When a unionization campaign is identified, Wal-Mart commonly counters it by 
sending in a team of experts well-trained in the art of denying certification. Wal-
Mart officials have also made it clear that if the union is successful in forcing the 
company to alter its business plan (through first contract arbitration for example) 
the result might well be an uneconomic operation that it will have to shut down. 
At Jonquière the union demanded regularized scheduling and increased 
guaranteed hours for full-timers to the industry norm (Gondziola 2005). Wal-
Mart spokesman, Andrew Pelletier, referred to this proposal as an unacceptable 
attempt to change the basic business model.  
Rather than the instrument for the establishment of democracy in 
industry, Wal-Mart characterizes unions as a form of business--one that thrives 
on management unresponsiveness to employee concerns. In its view, if the 
company avoids overt employee dissatisfaction, then employees do not need 
collective representation. To control dissatisfaction, the company operates an 
open door policy and insists that managers promptly investigate and resolve 
employee complaints. In its view, the appearance of a union organizing 
campaign is an overt indicator that its store managers are not doing their job 
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properly. In practice, store managers are put under great pressure to do 
whatever it takes to head off unionization.  
In embracing this philosophy, Wal-Mart is part of a larger American 
“union-free” movement (Adams forthcoming). Research suggests that Canadian 
employers generally, like their American counterparts, are opposed to 
unionization (Bentham 2002). However, the general consensus seems to be that 
unlike the Americans, and Wal-Mart in particular, Canadian strategies 
historically have been more subtle and muted.  Because of its huge public 
presence, Wal-Mart’s behaviour may well be having the effect of moving 
Canadian management in a more aggressively anti-union direction. 
In addition to its shop-by-shop unionizing campaign UFCW has recently 
joined with the National Union of Public and General Employees to promote the 
concept and philosophy of labour rights as human rights. In March of 2005 the 
two unions published a study reviewing the international human rights status of 
a group of core labour rights including the Right to Organize and Bargain 
Collectively and the failure of Canadian governments effectively to promote 
compliance with international standards and, in their capacity as employers, to 
abide by those standards. The study provides evidence that Canadian 
governments frequently violate the norms that they have promised to promote. 
The study also reviews the recent Supreme Court Case regarding agricultural 
workers in Ontario in which the Court effectively imported several aspects of 
international human rights law into Canada. In its 2001 Dunmore Decision, the 
Court ruled that, according to the Canadian Constitution, all Canadian workers 
(whether represented by a certified exclusive agent or not) have the right to 
organize, select their own leaders, develop their own program and make 
“representations” to their employer with the expectation that their employer will 
recognize those representatives and will deal fairly with them with a view 
towards working out issues in dispute (Fudge and Brewin 2005).  
Wal-Mart clearly is in violation of these international and constitutional 
norms and one part of the UFCW/NUPGE alliance is aimed at exposing the 
company’s illicit human rights and constitutional behaviour. The Dunmore 
decision implies that any employer who refuses to recognize and deal with the 
legitimate representatives of even a minority of its employees (as Wal-Mart does 
as a matter of company policy) is offending Canadian constitutional law. Even 
where it is unable to become certified as exclusive agent of all employees in a 
given unit, UFCW might demand constitutional recognition as the agent of its 
Wal-Mart members. It has not yet decided to take that step, however. In its 
Dunmore decision the Supreme Court did not require the Ontario government to 
invest agricultural workers with a right to strike or any other means of 
compelling a recalcitrant employer to negotiate in good faith. As a result, 
organized labour broadly rejected the decision as a significant step forward. In 
fact, the UFCW has appealed to the Court claiming that the new Ontario law 
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regulating agricultural employment relations does not comply with the 
Constitution.  
In addition to its general effort to promote respect for labour rights as 
human rights, NUPGE has signed a specific protocol committing it to assisting 
UFCW in its effort to organize Wal-Mart. Jointly, the two unions have put up 
substantial funds to produce a film (to be completed in 2006) aimed at 
popularizing knowledge of the company’s anti-social behaviour.  
As a matter of conscious choice UFCW-Canada has refrained from 
devoting resources to a Canadian equivalent of the Wake Up Wal-Mart 
campaign in the US. The prime object of the Canadian effort is to secure a 
collective agreement and any potential action is assessed against that goal. 
Nevertheless, the UFCW-Canada has been alert to construct alliances as 
appropriate. Thus when a group of students organized a “Wal-Town Tour” in 
2004 that went across Canada drawing attention to many of Wal-Mart’s anti-
social activities, the UFCW lent its support and encouragement. In the spring of 
2005 when SPHRE, the Society for the Promotion of Human Rights in 
Employment, (an international organization dedicated to promoting awareness 
of core labour rights as human rights) circulated a letter protesting the Jonquière 
shutdown on human rights grounds, UFCW supported that effort and helped to 
publicize the results. Over 200 professors, many from prominent universities 
such as Harvard, Stanford, Oxford and Cambridge, signed the document 
demanding that Wal-Mart respect the human rights of its employees to organize 
and bargain collectively. In May of 2005 UFCW worked with the Canadian 
Labour Congress to organize a “Day of Greeting” Wal-Mart customers at stores 
across the country. Customers were given pamphlets outlining the union’s 
complaints, local unionists attended rallies and interviews were provided to the 
press. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
UFCW-Canada is confident that eventually, most likely through first-
contract arbitration, it will secure a contract for one of Wal-Mart’s Canadian 
stores, and once it does, that it will be able to use that contract as a model to 
organize other stores not only in Canada but the U.S. as well. If a first agreement 
is imposed on Wal-Mart at St. Hyacinthe, the company will have a much more 
difficult time justifying a shut-down than it did at Jonquière. If the company was 
forced to negotiate in Canada, it would not be a first. It already deals with unions 
overseas in, for example, the United Kingdom and Germany and, most recently, 
China. However, Canadian negotiations might reverberate throughout North 
America and begin to move the company  away from its business model and, 
instead, adopt practices that are more of the industry norm. That is precisely the 
union’s aim but Wal-Mart has proven to be a very robust adversary. 
10  JUST LABOUR vol. 6 & 7 (Autumn 2005) 
The more recent campaign by NUPGE and UFCW to promote the notion 
of Labour Rights as Human Rights has the potential for changing the world of 
industrial relations in ways that may have an even greater long term effect than 
busting Wal-Mart’s “template for 21st century capitalism.” In continental Europe, 
collective representation is considered to be every worker’s right and laws and 
customs are in place that make that right effective for the large majority. In 
Canada, on the other hand, collective representation is enjoyed by only a 
minority of workers and its practice is on the wane even as Canadian 
governments promise on the international stage to promote its use. Fully 
embracing collective bargaining as a human right means that the goal becomes 
effective, independent representation for all workers and its absence a disgrace, 
as objectionable as the continuation of overt racism. By initiating a “Labour 
Rights are Human Rights” campaign UFCW and NUPGE have begun public 
dialogue on this issue but bringing about compliance on the ground will take a 
long, sustained and well-focused effort.  
 
                                                 
NOTES 
 
1 Much of the information on UFCW’s Wal-Mart campaign is available on the internet. Facts gleaned 
from internet searches were reviewed with UFCW staff for accuracy. Additional documentation was 
provided by the UFCW.  Special thanks are due to Brian McArthur and Andrew Mackenzie of the 
UFCW for their assistance with this project. 
2 The Board's decision may be accessed at: 
http://www.lancasterhouse.com/decisions/2005/sept/qlrc-bourgeois.pdf 
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